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SURVEY ARTICLES

Administrative Law
by Susan Wells Drechsel
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a broad range of
administrative law issues during 1995. In a case of first impression for
the Eleventh Circuit,1 the court held that a criminal defendant's time
spent in halfway and safe houses cannot be credited against the
defendant's sentence.' In reaching this conclusion, the court deferred
to a "program statement" issued without notice and comment by the
United States Department of Justice's Bureau of Prisons. The court
* Assistant Legislative Counsel, Georgia General Assembly. Former Special Assistant
Attorney General, State of Minnesota, and Legislative Director, United States
Representative Richard Shelby. Duke University (A.B., 1983); University of Minnesota
Law School (J.D. magna cure laude, 1991); Order of the Coif. Secretary, Administrative
Law Section of the Georgia Bar Association; Member, Administrative Law Section of the
American Bar Association. The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the
author, and not of the Office of Legislative Counsel.
1. Dawson v. Scott, 50 F.3d 884 (11th Cir. 1995). See discussion infra part III.
2. 50 F.3d at 888.
3. Id. at 886.
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also discussed, but did not decide, the first impression issue for the
circuit of the proper scope of judicial review in an appeal of a criminal
conviction for violation of an Endangered Species Act regulation.4 In
this case, the court applied the same scope of judicial review that would
be applied in a proceeding for direct review of the rule, and upheld the
defendant's conviction for the unlawful sale of Alabama red-bellied
turtles.'
The court continued its trend of deferring to an agency's factfinding
and statutory interpretation," including its emphasis on deferring to an
agency's resolution of perceived policy issues. However, the court did
reverse an agency's decision that applied a statutory requirement nonuniformly to the same type of Medicare provider.'
The court issued three opinions addressing the scope of federal court
jurisdiction in administrative law matters. The court declined, on
Article III grounds, to review a Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") decision to preempt state and federal court jurisdiction over
"lowest unit charge" complaints.9 The court also held that a prisoner
must exhaust his or her administrative remedies at the Bureau of
Prisons before a court can consider a Bivens claim for both injunctive
and monetary relief.' 0 In addition, the court held that the time
limitation for judicial review of a regulation issued under the Manufactured Housing Act was triggered by the date that the challenged rule
was published in the FederalRegister."
Finally, the court addressed the adequacy of an agency's consultation
with an advisory council where the statute requires consultation "to the
extent feasible." 2 In deciding whether additional consultation was
required after issuance of the proposed rule and before issuance of the
final rule, the court applied the "logical outgrowth" standard usually

4. United States v. Guthrie, 50 F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir. 1995). See discussion infra
part III.
5. 50 F.3d at 944, 947.

6. See discussion infra part III.'
7. Dawson, 50 F.3d at 890; Florida Manufactured Hous. Ass'n v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d
1565, 1577 (11th Cir. 1995).
8. Sarasota Memorial Hosp. v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir. 1995). See discussion

infra part III.
9. Miller v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 66 F.3d 1140, 1146 (11th Cir. 1995).
See discussion infra part II.
10. Irwin v. Hawk, 40 F.3d 347,349(11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 112 (1995).
See discussion infra part II.
11. Florida Manufactured Hous. Ass'n v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d 1565, 1573 (11th Cir. 1995).
See discussion infra part II.
12. Cisneros, 53 F.3d 1565, 1575 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 5404(b) (1980)). See discussion
infra part IV.
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used to determine when a proposed rule must be reissued for notice and
comment. 3
II.
A.

JURISDICTION TO REVIEW AGENCY ACTION

Application of Article Ilrs "Case or Controversy" Requirement to

JudicialReview of Agency Decisions

In Miller v. Federal Communications Commission,4 the court
considered a challenge by several candidates for public office to a
declaratory ruling by the FCC. In that ruling, the agency stated that all
complaints against broadcasters for failing to offer political candidates
the "lowest unit charge" for advertisements during the final weeks of a
campaign must be lodged with the Federal Communications Commission. 5 The FCC initiated the declaratory ruling proceeding on its own
motion, after observing "inconsistent decisions in state and federal court
litigation brought by candidates alleging overcharging by broadcast
stations."'
The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the candidates' petition for judicial
review after finding that the issue presented in the petition "constitutes
a hypothetical question rather than an actual case or controversy." 7
The court first characterized the FCC's declaratory ruling as a mere
interpretive rule:
The Commission's declaratory ruling... is not a regulation promulgated pursuant to section 315(d) [of the Communications Act]. Unlike the
regulations found at 47 C.F.R ..... the ruling does not define relevant
statutory terms, dictate the use of certain industry practices, or
prescribe appropriate methods for calculating the lowest unit charge.
Furthermore, the declaratory ruling is not an adjudication of a pending
case involving a dispute between a candidate and a broadcast station
licensee. It is not a decision, a letter of admonition, or an order levying
a penalty of forfeiture, a loss of operating authority, or a refund to the
candidate. Because it is axiomatic that Congress has not delegated,
and could not delegate, the power to any agency to oust state courts

13. 53 F.3d at 1576.
14. 66 F.3d 1140, 1146 (11th Cir. 1995).
15. Id. The FCC ruled that "any state cause of action dependent on any determination
of the lowest unit charge under Section 315(b) of the Communications Act, or of some other
duty arising under that subsection, is preempted by federal law. The sole forum for
adjudicating such matters shall be this Commission." 66 F.3d at 1143 (quoting 6 F.C.C.R.
7511 (1991)). The agency also preempted state causes of action based on section 315(b)
that are filed in federal district court under diversity jurisdiction. Id.
16. 66 F.3d at 1143.
17. Id. at 1142.
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and federal district courts of subject matter jurisdiction, the FCC's
declaratory ruling amounts to an agency opinion-a pronouncement
interpreting the Communications Act to the effect that Congress has
impliedly abolished state and federal court jurisdiction over lowest unit
charge violations."8
Then, noting that the case or controversy requirement of Article III"
"appl[ies] with the same stringency in the administrative law context,"20 the court concluded that "[flederal courts simply are not
permitted to render advisory opinions regarding agency pronouncements."21
B.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

In Irwin v. Hawk,22 issued per curiam, the court affirmed the district
court's dismissal of a federal prisoner's civil rights claim under
Bivens,2" based on the prisoner's failure to pursue his administrative
remedies at the Federal Bureau of Prisons."' Because exhaustion was
required by Bureau regulations, and not explicitly by statute, the court
reviewed the district court's dismissal under an "abuse of discretion"
standard. 5
In upholding the district court's dismissal for failure to exhaust, the
court focused principally on distinguishing the plaintiff's claim from that
presented in McCarthy v. Madigan.25 In McCarthy, the United States
Supreme Court held that a federal prisoner who initiates a Bivens action
solely for money damages need not exhaust the Bureau of Prisons
grievance procedure.
In contrast, emphasized the Eleventh Circuit,
Mr. Irwin sought both injunctive and monetary relief.28 Thus, stated
the court, "the grievance procedure probably would be capable of
producing the type of corrective action desired."29

18. Id. at 1144 (emphasis added).
19. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2.
20. 66 F.3d at 1146.
21. Id.
22. 40 F.3d 347 (11th Cir. 1995).
23. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
24. 40 F.3d at 348.
25. Irwin, 40 F.3d at 348 (citing Kobleur v. Group Hospitalization & Med. Svcs., Inc.,
954 F.2d 705, 711 (11th Cir. 1992)). The factors to be considered are: "(1) whether
requiring exhaustion in this case would further the policies underlying the doctrine; and
(2) whether any exceptions to the doctrine are applicable." Id.
26. 40 F.3d at 348.
27. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 156 (1992).
28. 40 F.3d at 348.
29. Id. (quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. 140, 153 n.5 (1992)).
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The court also rejected the prisoner's "general and conclusory
allegation" that exhaustion of his remedies at the Bureau of Prisons
would be futile because of "the bias of the administrative process. "8
The court found that the Bureau of Prisons' three-level administrative
review process "provides inherent insulation against potential bias and
prejudice arising at the institutional level.""' In addition, the court
noted that even though administrative denial of the prisoner's requests
for relief was the likeliest outcome, "in denying relief the Bureau may
give a statement of its reasons that is helpftd to the district court in
considering the merits of the claim."" Thus, exhaustion would not be
a futile exercise.
C. Triggerfor 7me Limitation on Filing Petitionfor Review: Date of
Order or Date of Publication in FederalRegister?
In FloridaManufacturedHousing Ass'n v. Cisneros,3 discussed more
fully below in Section III of this article, the court considered whether the
time limitation for filing a petition for review of a rulemaking order by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") was
triggered by the date on the order itself or by the date of the order's
publication in the Federal Register.4 The applicable statute in this
case was the Manufactured Housing Act, which requires filing of a
petition for judicial review "prior to the sixtieth day after such order is
issued."35
The court rejected the agency's argument that the term "issued" refers
to the date on which the rulemaking order was dated, rather than when
it was published in the FederalRegister. 6 First, the court declined to
defer to HUD's interpretation of this provision of the Manufactured
Housing Act, emphasizing that the agency had interpreted the term
"issued" differently in the same rulemaking proceeding.3 Second, the
court stated, "HUD's latest interpretation contravenes the plain meaning
of the term 'issued.' The verb 'issue' clearly refers to an act of public
pronouncement and not to the act of arriving at a private decision within

30. Id. at 349.
31. Id. The three-level review process includes the filing of a formal complaint with the
prison warden, with appeal available to the regional director and to the general counsel.
Id. at 349 n.2.
32. Id. at 348 (quoting Greene v. Meese, 875 F.2d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 1989)).
33. 53 F.3d 1565 (11th Cir. 1995).
34. Id. at 1573.
35. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5405(aXl) (1974) (emphasis added)).
36. Id. at 1574.
37. Id.
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the agency. " Third, HUD's interpretation of "issued" would give the
agency "the power to manipulate the jurisdiction of the federal
courts." 9 Finally, "[a]s a matter of fairness," said the court, "the sixtyday filing period should not begin to run until the public has notice of
the final rule's content."40
III.
A.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION

Review of an Agency's Regulation in a CriminalProceeding

In United States v. Guthrie,41 an appeal of a criminal conviction, the
court considered a challenge to the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service's listing of the Alabama red-bellied turtle as an endangered
species.42 The defendant had entered a plea of guilty in 1991 to
charges of violating the Endangered Species Act. 3 The defendant's
plea was conditioned upon his right to appeal several issues, including
the validity of the Fish and Wildlife Service's decision in 1987 to list the
Alabama red-bellied turtle as an endangered species." The defendant
claimed that the Alabama red-bellied turtle is not an endangered species
as defined by the statute, because the turtle is a hybrid and not a pure
species.45 In the proceedings before the district court, the defendant
sought permission to test the DNA of the turtles that were the subject
of his conviction, citing studies which allegedly demonstrated that the
Alabama red-bellied turtle was not a pure species.' The district court
denied these motions.
The court addressed three issues in its review of the Fish and Wildlife
Service's action: (1) the scope of judicial review in a collateral challenge
to an agency's regulation; (2) the scope of the record in the collateral
review; and (3) whether the Fish and Wildlife Service's listing of the
Alabama red-bellied turtle as an endangered species was arbitrary and
capricious.4
On the first issue-the scope of judicial review in a collateral
challenge to an agency's action-the court noted that this issue had not

Id. (quoting RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1015 (2d ed. 1993)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1574-75.
38.

41.

50 F.3d 936 (11th Cir. 1995).

42. Id. at 937.

43. Id. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
44. 50 F.3d at 939.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 939-40.
Id.
Id. at 942-44.
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been addressed previously by the Eleventh Circuit; and the court did not
resolve the issue in this case.49 After briefly discussing cases from
other circuits and the United States Supreme Court "suggest[ing] that
collateral review of any agency regulation in a criminal proceeding
should be narrow or nonexistent,""0 the court decided to apply the same
scope of review in this collateral challenge that would be applied in a
direct challenge to the regulation: "Even assuming that the scope of
collateral review is as broad as the scope of direct review, the regulation
in this case must still be upheld."5
Second, the court followed the rule, which is applied in direct judicial
review of agency action, that "a court does not consider any evidence
that was not in the record before the agency at the time that it made the
decision or promulgated the regulation." 2 Thus, the court decided not
to consider, in this collateral review, the defendant's proffered evidence
that the Alabama red-bellied turtle is not a pure species subject to the
Endangered Species Act. 53 The court noted that the' defendant had
ample opportunity to put this evidence before the Fish and Wildlife
Service earlier, either in a petition for direct judicial review of the rule
listing the turtle as an endangered species or in a petition requesting
that the agency revise its listing. 4 The court stated, "[plermitting a
challenge to an agency regulation on the grounds of new scientific
evidence to be made collaterally in a criminal prosecution would deprive
the courts of the expertise of the administrative agency, and would
prevent the agency from fulfilling its function." 5 In addition, the court
stressed, "[wie will not reward that choice [of the defendant to violate
the law, rather than to seek to change it] by allowing him to bypass the
agency and receive judicial review of the regulation in light of the new
[evidence." 5 6
Third, the court determined that the Fish and Wildlife Service did not
act arbitrarily or capriciously in adopting its regulation listing the
Alabama red-bellied turtle as an endangered species.57 The agency did
not "'entirely fail [] to consider an important aspect of the problem ..

49. Id. at 943-44.
50. Id. at 943.

51. Id. at 944. The court also noted that the Endangered Species Act does not contain
a provision, similar to that in the Clean Air Act, which expressly prohibits review of certain
agency actions in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 945.
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Nor was the [agency's] finding 'so implausible that it could not58be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.'"
In this decision, the court also noted that "[this circuit is 'highly
deferential' to an agency's consideration of the factors relevant to its
decision. " "
Based on the discussion above, the court upheld the defendant's
conviction under the Endangered Species Act.60
B. Deference to an Agency's Statutory Interpretationon Preemption
In Lohr v. Medtronic, 1 the court deferred to the Food and Drug
Administration's ("FDA") interpretation of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976,62 on the issue of that federal statute's preemption of
state law. In this case, the plaintiffs had sued Medtronic under several
state law theories for manufacturing an allegedly defective pacemaker.
The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 included an express preemption provision," which the FDA had interpreted in a regulation.E4
The court rejected Medtronic's argument that the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc." required
an analysis governed entirely by the express language of the statute:
Cipollone did not prohibit reliance on an agency's preemption
regulation. While the opinion speaks only of "the express language" of
the statutes, neither of the statutes examined in Cipollone had
regulations interpreting its preemptive scope and nothing in the
opinion indicates that the issue of preemption regulations was ever
raised or considered. Moreover, the Supreme Court... has examined
another agency's preemption practices in at least one post-Cipollone
case. We are therefore unable to conclude that Cipollone created an
express preemption rule which forecloses our examination of the FDA's
regulations."
Having determined that Cipollone posed no barrier to considering the
FDA's interpretation of the statutory provision on preemption, the court

58. Id. at 946 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983)).
59. Id. (citing Hussion v. Madigan, 950 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1992)).
60. Id. at 946-47.
61. 56 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
62. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-3601 (1972 &Supp. 1996).
63. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1995).
64. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1995).

65. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
66. 56 F.3d at 1344 (citing American Airlines v. Woolen, 115 S. Ct. 817, 825 (1995)
(discussing the Department of Transportation'sinterpretation of its authority to displace
courts in air carrier contract disputes)).
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reviewed the agency's interpretation under the Chevron67 standard and
found it reasonable and entitled to deference by the Court."
C. Deference to an Agency's Statutory Interpretationin Traditional
Agency Activities
1. Deference to a "Program Statement" Issued by the Bureau
of Prisons. Dawson u. Scott69 was a habeas corpus case in which a
criminal defendant sought credit against his sentence for cocaine
distribution for the 104 days he spent in a halfway house (in lieu of
bond) prior to his scheduled trial, and for the 384 days he spent in a safe
house after pleading guilty and agreeing to cooperate with the federal
prosecutors and before sentencing. In this case of first impression for
the Eleventh Circuit, the court in a two to one decision held that such
time would not be credited against a defendant's sentence.7"
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on a "program
statement" issued by the United States Department of Justice's Bureau
of Prisons ("BOP").7" The program statement interpreted 18 U.S.C.
§ 3585(b), which states that a "defendant shall be given credit toward the
service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official
detention prior to the date the sentence commences .... "72 The issue
in this case was whether the time the defendant
73 spent in the halfway
and safe houses constituted "official detention."
As an initial matter, the court restated the traditional standard of
review of an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers:
To interpret a statute administered by an agency, the Chevron court
established a "two-step" process. First, if congressional purpose is
clear, then interpreting courts and administrative agencies "must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."
A second level of review, however, is triggered when "the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue." Where an
administrating agency has interpreted the statute, a reviewing court
is bound by the Chevron "rule of deference." "A court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation" by an administrative agency. Agency interpretation is

67.
(1984).
.68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
56 F.3d at 1343-45.
50 F.3d 884 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 885.
Id. at 889.
Id. at 887 (alteration in original).
Id. at 886.
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reasonable and controlling unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute." Thus, "we defer to an agency's
reasonable
interpretation of a statute it is charged with administer74
ing."

After focusing on the language of the statute, the court noted, "[tlo the
extent that there is ambiguity in the congressional intent in section
3858(b)," the Bureau of Prisons has "resolved this ambiguity" in a
Program Statement. 7' The BOP program statement denied sentence
credit for time, like the defendant's, which is spent in a halfway or safe
house.7 ' Finding that the BOP's interpretation of the phrase "official
detention" in section 3858(b) was "'permissible,' 'reasonable,' and not an
'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary' statutory interpretation,;'
the court deferred to the BOP's interpretation.7 7 The court also quoted
with favor a statement, by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, that determining whether a halfway house is sufficiently similar to prison "'is not a question susceptible of rational determination, at least by tools of inquiry available to judges. It is a matter of
judgment, or policy, or discretion, and we are fortunate in having a
policy statement by the Bureau of Prisons which opines unequivocally'
that it is not."7 ' Finally, in upholding the denial of Mr. Dawson's
petition for habeas corpus, the court noted that three other circuits had
reached the same conclusion.
The interesting point in this case, for administrative law purposes, is
that the court accorded the deference required under Chevron to an
agency "program statement," without focusing on whether this type of
agency pronouncement is entitled to deference and, if so, how much
deference. 0 The court merely noted that
[tihe Third Circuit alone considers the BOP Program Statements to
be "internal agency guidelines" that the BOP may alter "at will" and,
thus, they are "entitled to a lesser level of deference from the courts

74. Id. at 886-87 (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 889.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 891 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843, 844 (1984)).
78. Id. at 890 (quoting Ramsey v. Brennan, 878 F.2d 995, 996 (7th Cir. 1989)).

79. Id. at 891 (citing Moreland v. United States, 968 F.2d 665 (8th Cir.) (en banc)
(plurality opinion), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1028 (1992); Ramsey v. Brennan, 878 F.2d 995

(7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Woods, 888 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1989)).
80. Id. at 889.
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than are published regulations subject to the rigors of the Administrative Procedures [sic] Act, including public notice and comment.8 1
One month after the Eleventh Circuit decided Dawson v. Scott, 2 the
8 on
United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in Reno v. Koray"
s
this issue of sentence credit for time spent in "official detention.' U The
Supreme Court independently assessed the meaning of the statutory
phrase "official detention" and reached the same result as the Eleventh
Circuit. The Supreme Court also indicated that the BOP policy
statement was entitled to "some deference." 5 The court stated,
As we have explained ... , the Bureau's interpretation is the most
natural and reasonable reading of § 3585(b)s "official detention"
language. It is true that the Bureau's interpretation appears only in
a "Program Statement"-an internal agency guideline-rather than in
"published regulations subject to the rigors of the Administrative
Procedur[e] Act, including public notice and comment...." But BOP's
internal agency guideline, which is akin to an "interpretive rule" that
"do[esJ not require notice-and-comment ... ," is still entitled to some
deference ... since it is a "permissible construction of the statute.""
2. Deference to an Agency's Application of Statutory Factors
and Assessment of Conflicting Expert Opinion. In Florida
Manufactured Housing Ass'n v. Cisneros,7 the court rejected a challenge by the Florida manufactured housing industry to a regulation
adopted by the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD")."s
The regulation at issue substantially
strengthened the wind resistance standards for manufactured housing
in the wake of Hurricane Andrew. In its review of the regulation, the
court considered whether HUD misinterpreted the meaning of "cost," as
that term is used in the Manufactured Housing Act. 9 The court also
addressed several claims made by the industry that the regulation was
arbitrary and capricious."

81. Id. at 891 n.15 (quoting Koray v. Sizer, 21 F.3d 558, 562 (3d Cir. 1994), rev'd sub
nom. Reno v. Koray, 115 S. Ct. 2021 (1995)).

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

50 F.3d 884 (11th Cir. 1995).
115 S. Ct. 2021 (1995).
Id. at 2021.
Id. at 2022.
Id. at 2027 (citations omitted).
53 F.3d 1565 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1583.
53 F.3d at 1568-69.
Id. at 1569.
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In promulgating manufactured housing standards, HUD must
consider, inter alia, "the probable effect of such standard on the cost of
the manufactured home to the public" as well as "the extent to which
any such standard will contribute to carrying out the purposes of this
chapter."91 In deciding whether to adopt the rule strengthening wind
resistance standards, HUD considered a broad range of societal costs and
benefits. The industry challenged this analysis, arguing that the factor
identified in 42 U.S.C. § 5403(f) "refers solely to the consumer purchase
price of manufactured homes."92 As described by the court, "the crux
of [the manufacturers'] claim is that HUD has erred by merging cost into
analysis, instead of considering it as a separate,
a general cost-benefit "93
independent criterion.
Noting that the Manufactured Housing Act does not "indicate precisely
how HUD is to consider this factor, or how much weight the agency
should give cost in weighing it against other factors," the court would
not disturb the agency's assessment."4 The court
"decline[d] the ... invitation to require an agency to accord greater

weight to aspects of a policy question than the agency's enabling
statute itself assigns to those considerations." As long as the agency
gives fair consideration to the relevant factors mandated by law, the
importance and weight to be ascribed to those factors is the type of
judgment that courts are not in a position to make. Instead, that
judgment is for the agency .... 95
The court also noted that even if the "cost" referred to in section
5403(f)(4) was limited to the consumer purchase price, the agency could
still consider societal costs and benefits under section 5403(f)(5) of the
Act.96

Following an expansive discussion of the scope of review under the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard in which it noted that this standard
is "highly deferential" and "presumes the validity of agency action," the
court rejected several arguments by the manufactured home industry
that HUD's wind resistance regulations were arbitrary and capricious. 97
The court upheld the regulation against a claim that it would not
prevent damage in the event of another hurricane as strong as An-

91.

42 U.S.C. § 5403(f)(4) & (5) (1995).

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

53 F.3d at 1577 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. (quoting Hussion v. Madigan, 950 F.2d 1546, 1554 (11th Cir. 1992)).
Id. at 1578.
Id. at 1572-73.
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drew."8 The court also upheld the regulation's application of uniform
construction standards to diverse geographic areas, stating that the
agency "neither refused to consider the appropriate factors nor committed a clear error of judgment."' Finally, the court upheld HUD's costbenefit analysis against a series of attacks by experts for the manufactured home industry:
The role of this Court is not to decide whether HUD or the manufacturers used the better technical data and methodologies; instead, our task
is to determine whether HUD's explanation of its administrative action
demonstrates that it has considered the appropriate factors required
by law and that it is free from clear errors of judgment."
3. Rejection of an Agency's Nonuniform Statutory Interpretation.

In Sarasota Memorial Hospital v. Shalala,'0 ' the court rejected

the Department of Health and Human Service's interpretation of a
provision of the Medicare statute. 10 2 That statute provides for revision
of payments due to hospitals based on a "wage index.""0 3 The issue in
the case was whether the hospital's payment of FICA taxes owed by the
employees constituted "wages" (which would be included in the index,
and thus increase the government's payments to the hospital) or "fringe
benefits" (which would not affect the payment calculation)." °4
The court rejected the Secretary's treatment of the hospital's payments
as "fringe benefits," stating:
The Secretary cannot make arbitrary distinctions between the same
payments by different providers without any basis. We see no reasonable basis for classifying the same FICA payments as wages when
deducted from an employee's gross pay, but as fringe benefits when
paid directly by the employer. In this case the Secretary's decision to
treat Memorial's employee FICA taxes as a fringe benefit for the
limited purpose of excluding it from the 1982 wage index for the
Sarasota [Metropolitan Statistical Area] contradicts the definition of
fringe benefits and is inconsistent with the Secretary's treatment of
employee FICA taxes as wages for most of the other provider hospitals
in the nation.'

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 1581-82.
Id. at 1581.
Id. at 1580 (emphasis in original).
60 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1513, 1514.
Id. at 1508, 1511.
Id. at 1511.
Id. at 1513.
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D.

Review of an Agency's FactualFindings
In two 1995 cases, the court addressed situations where the agency
rejected an administrative law judge's ("AW") factual findings. In
Bechtel Construction Co. v. Secretary of Labor,'° the court upheld the
Secretary of Labor's determination that a nuclear power plant construction contractor had violated the whistleblower provisions of the Energy
Reorganization Act. 7 The ALJ agreed with Bechtel that the company
had not laid off its employee because of any legally protected activity by
the employee, finding that the employee's termination was part of a
"bona fide [workiforce reduction.""~ The Secretary of Labor disagreed
with the ALT's assessment, finding that the employee had established
that he was laid off because he had engaged in a protected activity."°
The court upheld the Secretary of Labor's factual findings under the
traditional "substantial evidence" test. It elaborated on this standard of
review where the ALJ and the agency reach different factual conclusions:
[Wlhen there are disagreements between the Secretary and the AU
involving questions of fact and credibility, the court may examine the
evidence more critically in determining whether there is substantial
evidence to support the Secretary's decision. Under that standard, we
are not required to choose between the ALJ's and Secretary's determination. Rather, we merely require that the Secretary's choice in
adopting two fairly conflicting views, "be supported by articulate,
cogent, and reliableanalysis.""'

Finding that this standard was met, the court upheld the Secretary's
factual findings.
In JCC, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission,"' the court
held that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") did not
err when it conducted a de novo review of the factual record regarding
defendants' violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, rather than
remand the case to the ALIJ. In upholding this procedural decision by
the Commission, the court emphasized two points. First, the court did
not view this case as a "true" de novo review by the Commission,
because the Commission had not resolved a credibility dispute on a
"cold" record. Instead, the Commission had merely believed prosecution
witnesses whose credibility was not challenged by the defendants. "This

106. 50 F.3d 926 (11th Cir, 1995).
107.

42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1995 & Supp. 1996).

108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 930.
Id. at 931.
Id. at 933 (emphasis added).
63 F.3d 1557 (11th Cir. 1995).
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was," noted the court, "a situation where 'it fairly could be said that a
credibility evaluation from hearing and seeing witnesses testify was
unnecessary' on the part of the Commission."" 2 Second, the court
emphasized that the Administrative Procedure Act gives the agency the
authority to conduct an independent review of the factual record.'
When an agency conducts such an independent review, it must
"expressly reject[] the AI's fact findings and.., sufficiently articulate[]
its reasons for doing so." 4 The CFTC met this standard. Thus, the
court held that the Commission did not err in making its own factual
findings rather than remanding the case to the AiJ. It is noteworthy
that both the Commission and the AUJ concluded that the defendants
had violated the Commodity Exchange Act. The Commission "simply felt
that the [AU's] documentation of those [credibility] determinations was
too ambiguous to be effectively reviewed on appeal."115
IV

AGENCY CONSULTATION WITH AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE

In Florida Manufactured Housing Ass'n v. Cisneros,"" discussed
more fully above in Part III of this Article, the court rejected a claim
that the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") had
failed to adequately consult with the National Manufactured Home
Advisory Council.. before it adopted regulations which strengthened
wind resistance standards for manufactured homes. The Manufactured
Housing Act requires HUD to consult with the National Manufactured
Home Advisory Council "to the extent feasible" when it revises manufactured home standards."' In this rulemaking proceeding, the agency
convened the Advisory Council for a two-day session on its proposed rule.
The Advisory Council adopted a resolution recommending, inter alia,
specific modifications to the proposed rule, additional study, and that the
Advisory Council be reconvened to review public comments on HUD's
analysis of the further studies that the Council had recommended. The
agency issued the final rule without reconvening the Advisory Council,

112. Id. at 1565.

113. Id. at 1566-67.
114. Id. at 1566 (citing Parker v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1512, 1520 (11th Cir. 1986) (en
banc)).

115. Id. at 1566 n.27.
116. 53 F.3d 1565 (11th Cir. 1995).
117. The Council is composed of eight representatives from each of three groups:
consumers, industry, and government agencies. Id. at 1575 n.3 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5404(a)).
118. Id. at 1575 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5405(b)).
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and the manufactured home industry raised this failure in its challenge
to the final rule.11 9
The court held that HUD had adequately consulted with the Advisory
Council. 120 Noting that the agency had incorporated some of the
Council's recommendations into its final rule, the court stated, "[ilf we
were to require reconsultation whenever the Advisory Council demanded
it, the process might never end." 121 Moreover, "[plublic safety was
involved, and it is no exaggeration to say that too much delay could have
resulted in the loss of life."122 Finally, the court emphasized that "the
final standards were [not] so substantively different that they cannot be
considered a 'logical outgrowth' of the proposed standards upon which
the Advisory Committee was consulted.""2

119. Id. at 1568.
120. Id. at 1576.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. The court noted that the logical outgrowth test is normally used to determine
when a proposed rule must be reissued for notice and comment. Id. at 1576 n.4. However,
the court found that "the logical outgrowth test provides a helpful analogy for analyzing
the consultation requirement." Id,

